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CASE NOTES
economic, not ethnic or racial. It is submitted that the rule of "per se"
unconstitutionality is not applicable to the racially-cast eligibility
guidelines, inasmuch as these ethnic qualifications are merely auxiliary,
and constitute a reasonable means of pursuing a remedial purpose pro-
claimed in executive orders of the President. Furthermore, since the
operation of the 8 (a) program infringes upon no right claimed in this
case which the law is prepared to recognize, the contention that one
of the plaintiffs had been deprived of property without due process is
without merit. In using its procurement powers to further the purposes
proclaimed in the 1970 8(a) regulations, and to promote economic
integrations at the entrepreneurial level, the government has chosen a
valid and appropriate means of remedying the economic inequities
which for too long have been characteristic of American life.
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, III
Income Tax—Reallocation of Gross Income—Controlled Corpora-
tions—Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 1 —Re-
spondent taxpayers, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and First Se-
curity Bank of Idaho, N.A. (the Banks), are national banks which were
wholly owned subsidiaries of First Security Corporation, a publicly
owned bank holding company. First Security Corporation (the Holding
Company) also controlled Ed. D. Smith & Sons (the Management
Company), Smith (the Insurance Agency) and, starting in 1954, an
insurance company, First Security Life Insurance Company of Texas
(Security Life).
In 1948, the Banks made arrangements to offer credit life insurance
to their borrowers. 2 Until 1954, the Banks referred all borrowers de-
ciding to purchase this insurance to two independent insurance car-
riers.8 Federal banking laws prohibited the Banks from receiving sales
commissions or other income from the credit insurance generated by
1
 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
2
 The Tax Court lists the reasons for the Banks providing this service:
. . . (1) to offer a service increasingly supplied by competing financial institu-
tions, (2) to obtain the benefits of the additional collateral which credit
insurance provides by repaying loans upon the death, injury, or illness of the
borrower, and (3) to provide an additional source of income—part of the pre-
miums from the insurance—to Holding Company or its subsidiaries.
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Commissioner, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321, 1322
(1967).
8
 The Banks followed a certain routine in making this insurance available to their
customers. The lending officer would describe the purpose and availability of credit life
insurance. If the borrower wanted the coverage, the Banks would fill out the required
form, deliver a certificate to the customer, and collect the premium or add it to his loan.
The completed forms were then forwarded to the Management Company which main-
tained the insurance records, forwarded customer premiums to the independent insurer,
and processed claims filed under the policies. The Banks' costs in providing these services
were estimated at $2000. 405 U.S. at 396-91'.
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them.' Because of this prohibition, during the period 1948-1954, the
independent carriers writing the insurance paid the sales commissions
to Smith, the Insurance Agency subsidiary. The Management Company
then reported these commissions as taxable income.5
This allocation continued until 1954, at which time the Holding
Company organized Security Life, "a new wholly owned subsidiary
licensed to engage in the insurance business."' With the formation of
Security Life, a new procedure was instituted whereby the credit life
insurance available to borrowers was to be written by another inde-
pendent company, American National Insurance Company of Galves-
ton, Texas (American National), and then reinsured by Security Life
pursuant to a "treaty of reinsurance. 77 The plan provided that American
National would furnish the actuarial and accounting services and would
receive fifteen percent of the premiums. No sales commissions were to
be paid from the balance. Rather, Security Life would retain the re-
maining eighty-five percent of the premiums in return for assuming
the risk under the policies. During the tax years 1955-1959 inclusive,
Security Life reported the total amount of the reinsurance premiums
in its gross income. This allocation resulted in a lower tax liability for
the Holding Company because the income of life insurance companies
was then subject to a lower tax rate than that of regular corporations.'
In 1962, the Commissioner, relying on his power under Section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to reallocate income within con-
trolled corporations to reflect the true income of corporate entities,'
sent deficiency notices to the respondents based on a reallocation to
4 National Banks are not authorized to act as insurance agents when located in areas
having a population in excess of 5000 inhabitants. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 "(1968). Section 92
of the National Bank Act was enacted in 1916. When the statutes were revised and
re-enacted in 1918, section 92 was omitted. Recent editions of the United States Code
have also omitted the section. Nonetheless, the Comptroller of the Currency still regards
section 92 to be effective and includes it in his Regulations. 12 CFR § 2.1-.5 (1971).
See 405 U.S. at 401 n.12. Section 92 does not explicitly prohibit national banks in
localities of over 5000 inhabitants from functioning as insurance agents but courts have
decided that it does so by implication. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance
Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); see Commissioner v. W. Morris Trust, 367
F.2d 794, 795 (4th Cir. 1966).
5 It is customary in the insurance industry for the party who generates the business
to be paid a "sales commission" ranging from 40% to 55% of the net premiums collected.
405 U.S. at 397.
6 Id. at 398.
7 Id.
8 26 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or alloca-
tion is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
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the Banks of approximately forty percent of Security Life's premium
income during the tax years 1955-1959. 1° The Tax Court upheld the
validity of the Commissioner's allocation on the basis of the decision
reached by the Seventh Circuit in Local Finance Corp. v. Commis-
sioner.il The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's decision,12
 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict between the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Local Fi-
nance Corp. and the Tenth Circuit's decision in First Security Bank.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commissioner
had erred in allocating to the Banks forty percent of the net premiums
which Security Life received for reinsuring credit insurance during
the tax years in issue. The narrow issue facing the Court was whether
"the generation of the credit insurance business by the banks sustains
the allocation of a portion of the premium income to them."" The Court
HELD: The Commissioner's exercise of his section 482 power was
unwarranted, and the premium income received by Security Life should
not have been reallocated to the Banks in order to reflect the true taxable
income of each. This note will examine the implications of the Court's
decision so far as the Commissioner's power to reallocate income
within controlled corporations under section 482 is concerned.
In deciding that the Commissioner's application of section 482
to the facts of the instant case was unreasonable, the majority rests its
opinion on two premises. It is submitted that both are erroneous. The
first ground was the Banks' non-receipt of the income in question: the
Banks had neither received nor attempted to receive reinsurance pre-
miums flowing from their borrowers' purchase of credit life insur-
ance." Yet the actual receipt of income is legally irrelevant under
the applicable test of section 482. That section gives the Commissioner
the power to reallocate income within controlled corporations "in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of
such organizations. . . . "115
 The regulations provide that the Commis-
sioner's authority to determine "true taxable income"
. . . extends to any case in which either by inadvertence or
design the taxable income, in whole or in part, of a con-
trolled taxpayer, is other than it would have been had the
15
 The Commissioner did not allocate any income which Security Life received for
reinsuring risks on mortgage, twin dollar, and borrow-by-check insurance, all of which
Security Life reinsured in addition to credit insurance. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1326
n.14.
11
 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 956 (1969). On facts, parallel
to those in First Security Bank, the Seventh Circuit held in Local Finance that the Com-
missioner's allocation to the finance company that generated the insurance commissions
was valid.
12
 First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir.
1971).
15 Id. at 1196.
14 405 U.S. at 402.
15 See note 9 supra.
10 Treas. Reg. § 482-1(c) (1972).
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taxpayer in the conduct of his affairs been an uncon-
trolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncon-
trolled taxpayer.'
The purpose of section 482's broad delegation of authority to the Com-
missioner is to prevent "artificial shifting, milking, or distorting of
the true net incomes of commonly controlled enterprises."' Under sec-
tion 482, then, the Commissioner determines taxable income on the
basis of whether the corporation earned—not whether it received—
the income? Moreover, the assignment of income cases have long held
that mere non-receipt of income is insufficient to avoid taxation. 2° Thus
the majority's emphasis on actual receipt of funds ignores the basic
thrust of section 482 and is without foundation in relevant case law.
As Justice Blackmun points out in his dissenting opinion, the
application of the "uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length"' test
set forth in the regulations to the facts in this case underscores the un-
fairness of the result reached.22 There is little doubt that in an arm's
length transaction, an unrelated insurer would have paid sales com-
missions to the respondent Banks for their services." However, as a
result of the majority holding, the Banks' insurance affiliate reports
the premium income and is taxed on it at the preferential rates allowed
to life insurance companies, and so derives a significant advantage
over an uncontrolled taxpayer in the same business.
The second premise for the Court's conclusion is that federal law
prohibits the Banks from receiving the reinsurance premiums." In
the words of Justice Blackmun, the Court's reliance on that fact links
"legality with taxability or, to put it better oppositely, .. . it ties
17 Treas. Reg. § 482-1(c) (1972).
18 B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Share-
holders 15-21 (3d ed. 1971).
19 In Local Finance, the Seventh Circuit stated that
the two primary elements which must exist to sustain a section 482 allocation
are the existence of commonly controlled companies and the earning of income
by certain of these companies which in the absence of the Commissioner's
reallocation would not adequately be reflected in the income they would other-
wise report for federal income tax purposes.
407 F.2d at 632 (emphasis added).
29 See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (assignment of taxpayer's interest
coupons attached to bonds); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of one-half
interest in taxpayer's salary to his wife); see generally Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 604-10 (1948).
21 See note 17 supra.
22 405 U.S. at 418 (dissenting opinion).
28
 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
First Security Bank of Utah, NA., 405 U.S. 394 (1972). The issue under section 482
is whether the Banks' income was clearly reflected during the years when they performed
selling and processing services for Security Life. "The answer to this question turns on
federal tax law, not on federal banking law, and under the former, illegal gains, like
legal gains, are taxable whether received or not." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 29.
See also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
24
 See note 4 supra.
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illegality to receive with inability to tax."' Such a linkage of illegality
with nontaxability stands in sharp contrast to the principles enunciated
by the Court in James v. United States" and represents a reaffirmation
of the "claim of right" doctrine" which had emerged from the earlier
case of Commissioner v. Wilcox. 28 Hence First Security Bank has
important retrogressive implications.
In Wilcox, the Supreme Court reached the result that under the
predecessor of section 61(a) embezzled funds were not income to the
embezzler in the year of embezzlement. 2° The basis for the Wilcox
decision was that a "taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence
of a claim of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite
unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would otherwise
constitute a gain."30
 Since Wilcox obtained the funds by means of a
criminal act and held it "without any semblance of a bona fide claim
of right," being "at all times under an unqualified duty . . . to repay
the money to his employer . . . ," the Court held that the embezzled
funds were includible in gross income. 31 Wilcox, then, stood for the
proposition that funds obtained from illegal sources were not taxable
in the year of receipt. However, six years later, in Rutkin v. United
States," the Court held that extorted income was taxable to the extor-
tioner in the year of the crime. The Rutkin Court attempted to dis-
tinguish Wilcox on the basis that an embezzler gains no title to the
sums he appropriates while an extortioner gains a voidable title,33 but
the distinction was not persuasive.
Finally, in 1961, the James Court overruled the Wilcox rule and
determined that illegal receipts were taxable as gross income in the
year of receipt. Justice Warren, writing for the James majority, set
forth a cogent analysis of the gains includible within the concept of
"gross income" under section 61(a).° 4 He stated that the starting
point in the construction of the phrase "gross income" is the recogni-
tion of the intention of Congress "to tax all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted."' In addition, the language of section 61(a), "all
income from whatever source derived," has been held to include "all
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
25 405 U.S. at 418 (dissenting opinion).
66 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
27 The "claim of right" doctrine is a useful tool in the area of tax accounting to
allocate receipts to a given tax year. If a taxpayer receives income under a "claim of
right" and without restriction as to its disposition, he must report the income in the year
of receipt.
28 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
29 Id. at 408. Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is the predecessor
of Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
36 327 U.S. at 408.
81 Id.
82 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952).
" Id. at 137.
84 366 U.S. at 219.
85 Id.
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have complete dominion."38 Justice Warren then concluded that "these
broad principles" mandate that income derived from both legal and
illegal sources be reported in "gross income."' Under James, the test
of nontaxability was whether there was a "consensual recognition ex-
press or implied of an obligation to repay. . .
Nevertheless, the Court's decision in First Security Bank seems
to render James inapplicable to the receipt of income within controlled
corporations. The apparent effect of First Security Bank is that illegal
income within a controlled corporation will no longer be required to
be included in "gross income." In the case at bar, the Banks violated
a federal statute by performing the services which generated the insur-
ance premiums. The Court's decision means that the unlawfulness of
the funds in the Banks' hands, together with the Banks' power to shift
the income to an insurance affiliate, precludes the inclusion of the pre-
miums in "gross income." The effect of the majority opinion, then, is
to create a legal bar to the taxation of illegal income within controlled
corporations.
This result is inconsistent with section 61 (a)'s requirement that
"all income from whatever source derived" be reported as well as with
the James decision. Section 61(a) requires that the true earner of
income be taxed 39 Even if James had written a check to his daughter
for the amount of the embezzled funds before he received those funds,
the Supreme Court would almost certainly have determined that "the
exercise of power to dispose of income and procure the payment of
it to another is the equivalent, for federal tax purposes, of the realiza-
tion of income . . . ." ° Since sections 61 and 482 are both designed to
tax the true earner of income, the result should be the same under each.
It is apparent, then, that First Security Bank's imposition of the re-
ceipt-of-income and illegality tests on section 482 sets up a conflict
between that section , as so interpreted, and section 61(a) and James.
Moreover, the TVilcox "claim of right" rule, once overruled in
James, now appears revitalized as a principle of law in this area. First
Security Bank's virtual reaffirmation of the Wilcox rule places the hold-
ing company in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the unaffiliated cor-
poration. The holding company can divert income to a subsidiary to
avoid surtaxes'41 or to offset the latter's net operating losses. Should
one of its subsidiaries engage in unlawful solicitation of insurance sales
or charge more than the lawful rate in a regulated industry, the hold-
ing company can redirect the illegal funds to an unregulated affiliate.
00 Id., quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1954).
87 366 U.S. at 219. ,
88 Id.
39 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
40 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 23, at 22. In support of this statement,
Petitioner's Brief cites Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940).
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11, places a surtax of 26% on corporate income over
$25,000.
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As a result of the Court's decision, the Commissioner no longer pos-
sesses the authority under section 482 to reallocate income to a sub-
sidiary which has not in fact received the prohibited funds.
Another example of a potential abuse encouraged by the majority
can arise where "captive insurance companies" are involved. 42 In a
typical situation of this sort, a finance company establishes a subsid-
iary life insurance company that issues customer policies in connection
with the parent's business. The subsidiary then charges excessive
premiums on this business and succeeds in diverting a portion of
the parent's income to it." At the time of the passage of the Life
Insurance Company Tax Act for 1955," Congress was concerned
about this problem and was advised that under section 482 the Com-
missioner had power to prevent such diversion by reallocating income.'
The holding of the Court in First Security Bank seems to ignore this
congressional concern.
In sum, First Security Bank can be said to encourage the forma-
tion of subsidiaries that will absorb the parent's income obtained from
illegal sources and will be taxed at lower rates than would the parent
on income diverted by the parent to the subsidiaries. The Commis-
sioner's power to reallocate income to effectuate the purposes of sec-
tion 482 is no longer an effective weapon against such practices. The
majority's reliance on the actual receipt of income is at odds with the
assignment of income cases as well as with section 61(a) and section 482
as previously interpreted, both of which incorporate the doctrine that
income is taxed to the true earner thereof." Finally, the Court's linkage
of illegality with nontaxability resurrects the Wilcox "claim of right"
doctrine and makes it available in cases of intercorporate transfers of
income. The revitalization of the Wilcox rule with respect to controlled
corporations may be expected to stimulate corporate formation of tax
protectorates.
HARRIS J. BELINICIE
Federal Income Taxation—Section 165( a ) —Losses: Corporate Loss
Deduction Denied on Sale of Realty Because Property Was Not Held
for Use in Trade or Business—International Trading Co.1—Peti-
tioner, a brewery supply business' in Wisconsin, purchased thirteen
42 405 U.S. at 425 n.14 (dissenting opinion).
42 Id. If the subsidiary charges excessive premiums on the parent's life insurance
policies, the latter thereby obtains a greater "ordinary and necessary" business deduction
under § 162(a) and thus reduces its taxable income. The subsidiary then reports the
excessive premiums in its income for that year.
44 Act of March 13, 1956, Pub. L. No. 429, 70 Stat. 36, as amended by the Life
Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959, Act of June 25, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat.
112, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1970).
40 405 U.S. at 425 (dissenting opinion).
46 See text at notes 19 and 39 supra.
1 57 T.C. 455 (1971).
2 In addition petitioners "held real estate and collected rents therefrom." Id. at 456.
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